An illustrative construction-firm scenario
A supplier asks to change bank details before Friday
A construction office receives an email that appears to come from a known supplier. It asks for the next progress payment to go to a new account and pressures the team to pay before the weekend. This scenario shows how we combine Microsoft 365 security, payment verification and staff training so a convincing message does not become a payment. It is not a claim about a named client or a recovered amount.
Payment-change fraud prevention combines technical email and identity controls with an independent call-back, two-person approval and a written change record; no single filter or employee has to catch every attempt.
Why the message looks credible
The attacker uses the project relationship, not just a fake logo
A supplier mailbox may be compromised, a lookalike domain may be registered, or a real conversation may be forwarded with the bank details changed. The message can mention the correct project, invoice and contacts while asking for one small exception to the normal process.
The right response is not to inspect the logo more carefully or reply to the same email. Stop, use the supplier’s known contact route, and require independent verification and approval before changing the payment instruction.
Warning signs in this scenario
- New bank details or a new payment method
- Pressure to skip the normal call-back
- A changed reply-to address or domain
- A request for secrecy or unusual urgency
Service profile
Controls that make the request harder to act on
| Layer | What we configure or practice | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | MFA, conditional access, least privilege and rapid account disablement | Make a stolen password less useful and contain a compromised account |
| Email authentication | SPF, DKIM and DMARC review, impersonation and lookalike-domain checks | Make supplier and internal impersonation more difficult |
| Mailbox and links | Suspicious forwarding rules, phishing and attachment controls, link review and report handling | Catch many malicious messages before or after delivery |
| Payment process | Independent call-back on a known number, two-person approval and a written supplier change record | Do not let the emailed request approve itself |
| Awareness and response | Role-based drills for office, project and finance staff, with clear escalation and bank contact | Make a suspicious request easy to stop and report |
The safe response
What the office should do next
01
Pause the change
Do not pay, reply, open more attachments or forward the request to someone else for approval.
02
Call the supplier on a known number
Use a number from the contract, an earlier trusted record or an independently verified source—not a number in the suspicious email.
03
Require a second approval
A different designated approver confirms the change and records who verified it, when and through which channel.
04
Report and investigate
IT checks the sender, mailbox rules, sign-ins, related messages and whether the supplier or a colleague has been compromised.
05
Practice before the next request
Use payment-change drills to keep the call-back and two-person rule familiar to everyone who can change payment instructions.
A useful exercise, not a promise
Technology supports the process; it cannot replace it
A secure email gateway may block one attempt, but another message can look ordinary or arrive through a real supplier account. The call-back and approval process is what stops a believable request from becoming a payment.
If money has already moved, call the bank’s fraud line immediately, then contact us. Do not wait for a training session or a normal discovery call. Our business email compromise guidance explains what happens next.
Evidence to retain
- Supplier change request and verification record
- Two-person approval and date
- Microsoft 365 and email review settings
- Training and drill completion
- Incident and bank-contact notes
Related guidance
Build the process around your team
Business Email Compromise response
What to do when a payment, mailbox or supplier account may be compromised.
Security awareness training
Role-based practice for the messages and approval decisions staff actually face.
Healthcare phishing protection
An anonymized example of email, web and endpoint controls plus staff reporting.
All client stories and scenarios
Browse the full library of anonymized outcomes and implementation scenarios.
Your payment controls
Test the process before a supplier request tests it for you
Review your email, identity and payment-change process with us. We will identify the gaps and give you a practical remediation plan.