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How to run a ransomware tabletop exercise for your leadership team: scenario, injects and an after-action template

A ransomware tabletop exercise is a guided discussion in which your leadership team talks through a realistic ransomware attack, one development at a time, using your real incident response plan, contacts and decision-makers. Nothing on your network is touched. For a firm of 25 to 200 people, a 90-minute session with the owner or managing partner, finance, operations, your IT lead or provider and whoever speaks to clients is a practical way to find the gaps that matter: missing phone numbers, unclear authority, untested backups and no agreed way to answer “do we pay?” Give each gap an owner and a due date, and close most within 30 days.

This is a planning guide. Dealing with ransomware right now? Call our 24/7 incident line at 1-650-300-7557 (you do not need to be a client) or see ransomware response and recovery.

What is a cybersecurity tabletop exercise?

CISA’s Cybersecurity Tabletop Exercise Tips describe a tabletop exercise, or TTX, as “a role-playing activity in which players respond to scenarios presented by one or more facilitators.” Players usually take their own roles. The aim is not a perfect performance but to work as a team and fix problems before a real incident.

A tabletop tests decisions, not technology. NIST’s incident response guidance, SP 800-61 Rev. 3, notes that leadership may have decision-making authority on high-impact actions, such as shutting down or rebuilding critical services, and that exercises help prepare staff and involved third parties for future incidents. Microsoft’s 2026 Digital Defense Report, drawing on scenario-based exercises with national governments, notes that coordination often breaks down where technical response meets policy decisions, and says “regular tabletop exercises and after-action reviews are essential” to putting response arrangements into practice.

Purpose and ground rules

Agree the objectives before anyone sees the scenario. For a first session, three are plenty:

  1. Confirm who leads the response and who can authorize shutting systems down or spending money.
  2. Confirm you can reach your IT provider, insurer, counsel and staff without email or office phones.
  3. Agree how the firm would make the ransom decision, and with whom.

CISA’s ransomware exercise package calls for an open, no-fault environment with no hidden agenda or trick questions, where decisions are not precedent-setting. Ground rules to read out:

  • Use the plan you have. Answer from your real plan and contact lists, even if they are incomplete. Finding gaps is the point.
  • No blame. You are testing the plan, not the people.
  • Everyone speaks. CISA’s tips say there should be no spectators, only participants.
  • Treat legal questions as questions. Record them as “ask our counsel whether…” instead of settling them in the room.

Who should attend a ransomware tabletop?

Keep it to six to ten people. If someone key cannot attend, CISA suggests writing that into the scenario, for example by making them unreachable on a flight.

SeatWhoWhat they answer for
Decision-makerOwner, managing partner or CEOShutdowns, spending, public statements and the ransom question
FinanceCFO, controller or office managerThe insurance policy and hotline, cash, payroll and cost approvals
OperationsOperations manager or firm administratorWhat must keep running, and the manual workarounds
TechnologyIT lead or IT providerIsolating systems, backups and restores
CommunicationsClient-communications leadWhat clients, staff and partners hear, and when
FacilitatorSomeone not making decisionsReads the injects, keeps time and keeps it blame-free
Note-takerA careful writer, not a playerRecords decisions, open questions and gaps
OptionalLegal counsel and insurance brokerNotification questions; the policy’s notice, panel and consent terms

Before the session: a preparation checklist

Beforehand, ask attendees to bring or confirm:

  • The incident response plan, printed. CISA’s #StopRansomware Guide recommends a hard copy and an offline version.
  • The insurer’s claims hotline, your policy number and your broker’s number, on paper.
  • An after-hours contact sheet: legal counsel, IT provider, key software vendors, phone and internet providers and your bank.
  • Backup facts from IT: what is backed up, where the offline or immutable copy is kept and when a restore was last tested.
  • A printed staff contact list, checked for current numbers.
  • Your critical systems, in the order you would need them back.
  • Each inject printed on a card, and the after-action template below for the note-taker.

The scenario: a Monday-morning ransomware attack

The scenario assumes a professional-services firm on Microsoft 365 with shared files, a line-of-business application and internet phones; adjust it to yours. Read each inject aloud, then work through its questions. Injects 1 and 2 follow a pattern described in a July 2025 joint #StopRansomware advisory from the FBI, CISA, HHS and MS-ISAC: attackers copy data, encrypt systems and threaten to publish what they took.

Inject 1, Monday 8 a.m.: locked files and a ransom note

On Monday morning, staff find that shared files will not open. A note in each folder says your data is encrypted. It names no price; it gives a unique code and a private website for contact. Your IT provider confirms the file server and several laptops are affected.

  • Who declares an incident and leads the response? CISA lists naming an incident manager too late as a common mistake.
  • Who can authorize disconnecting systems?
  • Who calls the IT provider, an incident response team and the insurer’s hotline, and from which phone?
  • Who makes sure affected devices are not wiped or switched off, and that the ransom note is kept as evidence?
  • What are staff told this morning, and by whom?

Inject 2, Monday 2 p.m.: “We have your client files”

The attackers say they copied client files before encrypting your systems and will publish them unless you pay. As proof, they list folder names that match yours.

  • How would we confirm what, if anything, was taken, and who does that work?
  • Ask your counsel whether this could trigger notification duties under state breach-notification laws, federal rules that apply to your firm or client contracts.
  • Who reports to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), a local FBI field office or CISA, and when? CISA’s tips list not notifying law enforcement, or having a non-lawyer do it, as a common mistake.
  • Is anyone allowed to reply to the attackers? What do we say if a client or a reporter calls?

Inject 3, Tuesday 9 a.m.: email and phones down, clients calling

To contain the attack, your IT provider has taken servers offline and blocked Microsoft 365 sign-ins. The office phones ran on the affected network and are down. Clients are calling staff mobiles, and one with a filing deadline on Thursday asks whether their documents are safe.

  • How do leaders and staff communicate without company email? CISA’s Cyber Guidance for Small Businesses says the plan should include an address book for use if the network is down.
  • Which work continues by hand, and who authorizes the workarounds?
  • What do we restore first? Are the backups intact and free of the attackers’ tools, and when was a restore last tested?
  • Who drafts and approves the holding statement for clients? CISA’s #StopRansomware Guide recommends keeping holding-statement templates in the communications plan.

Inject 4, Tuesday 3 p.m.: the insurer, the panel firm and “do we pay?”

Your insurer has assigned breach counsel and a response firm from its panel, and reminds you that some costs need its consent first. The attackers name a price and a deadline. The managing partner asks: do we pay?

The room is testing how the firm would decide, not whether paying is right in general. The decision belongs to leadership, with counsel, the insurer and law enforcement involved. Facts the facilitator can read out:

  • The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) says in its 2021 advisory on ransomware payments that the U.S. government strongly discourages all private companies and citizens from paying ransom or extortion demands.
  • OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations based on strict liability, so a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction can be held civilly liable even without knowing, or having reason to know, that a transaction was prohibited.
  • For a payment that may have a sanctions nexus, OFAC says it will treat these as significant mitigating factors in an enforcement response: a self-initiated and complete report to law enforcement or a relevant agency such as CISA, made as soon as possible after discovery; full and ongoing cooperation with law enforcement; and earlier steps to reduce extortion risk, such as offline backups and incident response plans.
  • The July 2025 joint advisory says the agencies do not encourage paying a ransom, because payment does not assure that files will be recovered, and the FBI and CISA urge prompt reporting whether or not you pay.
  • Who has the authority to decide, and who must be consulted first?
  • Ask your counsel whether a payment could raise sanctions issues and how that would be checked.
  • What does our policy say about extortion and consent? Ask the broker now, not on the day.
  • How will our own IT provider work alongside the panel firm? Our guide to working with your cyber insurer after an attack covers panels, consent and breach counsel.

Questions for each role

If discussion stalls, turn to individual seats:

RoleQuestions to put to them
Owner or managing partnerWhat would make you shut everything down? What can you approve alone? Who speaks for the firm publicly?
FinanceHow do we pay staff and vendors if systems are down?
OperationsWhich processes must keep running, and what is the workaround for each?
IT lead or providerHow do you isolate systems without destroying evidence? Who can reach the offline backups?
Client communicationsWho tells staff what to say, and what not to say?

Facilitator timing for a 90-minute session

The closing review is what CISA’s exercise package calls a hotwash: a discussion of strengths and areas for improvement held immediately after the exercise.

MinutesSegmentFacilitator notes
0-10Welcome and ground rulesState the objectives and introduce the note-taker
10-25Inject 1: locked filesPush for names: who declares, who decides, who calls whom
25-40Inject 2: data theft claimBring in counsel questions and law-enforcement reporting
40-55Inject 3: email and phones downTest the out-of-band contact list and restore priorities
55-70Inject 4: “do we pay?”Keep to how the decision is made, with whom and on what facts
70-85HotwashAsk each person what worked, what did not and what surprised them
85-90CloseRead back the gaps, confirm owners and set a review date

After-action template

The note-taker turns the hotwash into a short table the same day: one named owner, a specific fix and a due date for each gap. CISA’s tips recommend building the lessons into the incident response plan after every exercise. Example gaps a first ransomware tabletop might surface, with fixes that fit in 30 days:

GapOwnerFixDue dateStatus
Insurer hotline held only in emailFinance leadPrint it with the plan and keep copies off-site30 daysOpen
Nobody named to declare an incidentOwnerName an incident lead and a deputy in the plan30 daysOpen
No agreed authority to shut systems downOwner and IT leadWrite it down, and agree pre-approved containment steps with your security provider30 daysOpen
Restores never testedIT leadRestore one critical system and record the result and date30 daysOpen
No way to reach staff without emailOperations leadBuild a printed call tree and agree a backup channel30 daysOpen
No agreed process for the ransom decisionOwnerRecord who decides and who is consulted: counsel, the insurer and law enforcement30 daysOpen

Review the table at the next leadership meeting and the next exercise, and keep the dated record with the plan.

Compare your current process with the recommended one

During an ACS Cyber exercise, we ask the team to explain what it would actually do today, in order, using the current plan, tools and contact lists. We record the real process before suggesting changes. A scenario does not touch live systems; any later technical review or remediation is separately authorized.

Decision areaCurrent evidence to captureRecommended improvement to evaluate
Notice and escalationWho notices, who declares an incident, who calls the IT provider and how the insurer is reachedA named incident lead, deputy and usable out-of-band contacts
Identity and sessionsHow accounts are secured, which sign-in method is used and how sessions are revokedPhishing-resistant authentication, controlled administrator access and a documented session-review process
Devices and evidenceWho isolates a device and how logs, downloads and browser changes are preservedManaged devices, agreed containment authority and an evidence-preservation checklist
Mailbox and paymentsHow rules, forwarding and unexpected sent mail are checked; how changed bank details are approvedMailbox-change alerts and independent call-backs using a known number, with a second-person review
Insurer and counselThe policy’s notice, consent and panel requirements, and who makes legal decisionsThe current claims contact in the offline plan, with counsel and the insurer involved at the right decision points
Continuity and recoveryWhich work must continue, what is restored first and when a restore was last checkedNamed recovery owners, tested restores and an approved route for temporary work

The result is a prioritized hardening record: what happens now, the gap or uncertainty, the recommended control or process, the responsible owner and the evidence needed after the change. For a related account-compromise example, read our anonymized Microsoft 365 payment-fraud investigation.

Cyber insurance: evidence and policy questions

A tabletop can support accurate answers about incident planning and provide a dated after-action record. It does not establish insurance eligibility, coverage, a premium change or a claim outcome. Marsh’s Cyber Risk Intelligence Center includes incident-response planning among the controls it studies; we do not turn that research into a promised result for your organization.

  • Beazley’s incident-response tabletop resource describes a facilitated exercise for eligible policies. Its availability conditions are part of the offering, not a universal requirement for every policyholder.
  • Chubb’s U.S. Cyber Services page describes a virtual incident-response exercise and related readiness resources for policyholders. Its terms note that these offerings do not establish insurance coverage for a particular incident.
  • Your broker and carrier can confirm whether your application or policy requires a written plan, a test or particular evidence. Review the cyber-insurance readiness guide for application and evidence questions.

How often should you run a tabletop exercise?

CISA’s Cyber Guidance for Small Businesses says: “Host quarterly tabletop exercises (TTXs).” It also says to review the incident response plan “quarterly and after every security incident or ‘near miss’.” CISA’s tips add that tabletops do not have to be large productions: a short discussion at the start of a staff meeting can supplement a full exercise.

A workable rhythm is one full leadership session like this each year, shorter scenarios in the other quarters and an extra session after a big change, such as a new IT provider or insurer. To keep exercises useful:

  • Change the attack: a fraudulent wire request, a compromised Microsoft 365 account or a breach at a key vendor.
  • Change the conditions: a holiday weekend, or the owner or IT lead unreachable.
  • Add a twist: the backups were also encrypted, or a reporter calls.
  • Borrow material: CISA’s tabletop exercise packages include a ransomware situation manual you can adapt.

How we help

ACS Cyber is the managed security services provider (MSSP) and cybersecurity division of Atlantic Computer Systems, with an in-house 24/7 SOC. Through our advisory and vCISO service, your vCISO writes or updates your incident response plan with you, reflecting the notification steps in your cyber-insurance policy and listing your legal counsel. We then run the exercise for leadership and key staff, record what worked and what did not, and deliver a written after-action summary with improvement actions and plan updates.

The plan we write puts our 24/7 incident line at the top. The line is open to clients and non-clients alike, and our incident response team contains the threat and investigates in-house. Clients of our managed detection and response service agree containment rules in advance, so SOC analysts can take pre-approved actions such as isolating a device. Restore questions need an owner too: Atlantic Computer Systems, our parent company, provides managed IT and managed cloud and backup services.

Frequently asked questions

How do I run a ransomware tabletop exercise for a small business?

Book 90 minutes with your decision-maker, finance, operations, IT lead or provider and client-communications lead, plus a facilitator and note-taker. Work through a four-stage scenario with your printed plan, then give each gap an owner, a fix and a due date.

Do cyber insurers ask whether we have tested our incident response plan?

Insurers do pay attention to incident response planning: an August 2025 report from Marsh McLennan’s Cyber Risk Intelligence Center counts it among the cybersecurity controls tracked by the cyber insurance industry. Check your application for questions about a written plan and when it was last tested, and answer each literally and accurately; whether a tabletop answers a particular carrier’s question is for your broker and carrier. See the controls underwriters commonly ask about.

What questions should leadership answer in a ransomware tabletop?

Who leads the response, and who can authorize shutting systems down? How do we reach our IT provider, insurer, counsel and staff without email? Was data taken, and must anyone be told? What do we restore first? Who makes the ransom decision, and with whom?

Plan your first tabletop

In a free 30-minute consultation, we can help you choose objectives, shape the scenario and decide who attends. If you are dealing with ransomware now, call our 24/7 incident line at 1-650-300-7557 instead.

Want a second opinion on your security?

Talk with an ACS Cyber specialist about your environment, your obligations and the next practical step. Dealing with an active incident? Call our incident line at 1-650-300-7557 (after-hours emergency support is available).

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